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  • 1.
    Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
    Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Exzellenzcluster Science of Intelligence & Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Berlin, Germany; Institut für Philosophie, Berlin, Germany.
    Deflationary realism: Representation and idealisation in cognitive science2021In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an alternative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justified by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model, deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, while keeping allegiance to realism.

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  • 2.
    Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Context as knowledge2022In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 37, no 4, p. 543-563Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been argued that common ground information is unsuited to the role that contexts play in the theory of indexical and demonstrative reference. This paper explores an alternative view that identifies shared information with what is common knowledge among the participants. We argue this view of shared information avoids the problems for the common ground approach concerning reference while preserving its advantages in accounting for communication.

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  • 3.
    Nowak, Ethan
    Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK.
    No context, no content, no problem2020In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, philosophers have offered compelling reasons to think that demonstratives are best represented as variables, sensitive not to the context of utterance, but to a variable assignment. Variablists typically explain familiar intuitions about demonstratives—intuitions that suggest that what is said by way of a demonstrative sentence varies systematically over contexts—by claiming that contexts initialize a particular assignment of values to variables. I argue that we do not need to link context and the assignment parameter in this way, and that we would do better not to.

  • 4.
    Peet, Andrew
    The School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK.
    Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics2021In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 37, no 5, p. 914-932Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I argue that assertoric content functions as a means forus to track the responsibilities undertaken by commu-nicators, and that distinctively assertoric commitmentsare distinguished by being generated directly in virtueof the words the speaker uses. This raises two ques-tions: (a) Why are speakers responsible for the contentthus generated? (b) Why is it important for us to distin-guish between commitments in terms of their mannerof generation? I answer the first question by developinga novel responsibility based metasemantics. I answerthe second by reference to the conflicting pressuresgoverning the resources we have available for apprais-ing speech.

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  • 5.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Centre for the Study of Mind and Nature, Oslo.
    Protagonist projection2013In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 28, no 2, p. 204-232Article in journal (Refereed)
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