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  • 1.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Bergman, Mats
    Swedish Competition Authority and The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Rudholm, Niklas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    The impact of generic drug competition on brand name market shares - evidence from micro data2001In: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0889-938X, E-ISSN 1573-7160, Vol. 19, no 4, p. 423-433Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyses how market shares for brand name drugs are affected by generic competition. The analysis is based on micro data for twelve different original drugs, which are all subject to generic competition. For five of these drugs, we find that the price of the original relative to the average price of the generic substitutes significantly affects the market share of the original drug. In addition, the introduction of a so called "reference price" system appears to have had a significant impact on the market shares of five original drugs.

  • 2.
    Bergman, Mats
    The Swedish Competition Authority, Sweden; The Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden.
    A note on N. Economides: the incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist2000In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0167-7187, E-ISSN 1873-7986, Vol. 18, no 6, p. 985-988Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 3. Bergman, Mats
    A prohibition against losses?: the commission's deutsche post decision2001In: European Competition Law Review, ISSN 0144-3054, Vol. 22, no 8, p. 351-354Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Implications of Commission decision that Deutsche Post had abused dominant position through predatory pricing on mail order parcel services and by provision of fidelity rebates.

  • 4.
    Bergman, Mats
    Nationalekonomi, Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sverige; Swedish Competition Authority, Sweden.
    A welfare ranking of two-sided market regimes2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Two-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter’s case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Some support is found for the policy adopted by the EU Commission in the competition law case concerning Visa’s interchange fees.

  • 5.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Auditing and compliance in public procurement: an empirical assessment2023In: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, Vol. 23, no 2, p. 125-144Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose: This study aims to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of government auditing of local authorities' compliance with the procurement rules.

    Design/methodology/approach: A diff-in-diff approach is used where the measure of compliance is (changes in) the incidence of private litigation under the Public Procurement Act, in audited vs non-audited municipalities. Further, semi-structured interviews were conducted with chief procurement officials.

    Findings: No statistically significant effect is found. While strong effects of audits can be ruled out, the statistical results and the interviews do not, however, contradict a modest but long-lasting effect.

    Originality/value: Few studies have addressed the effect of public procurement auditing on compliance. This study develops an empirical framework and presents empirical results.

  • 6. Bergman, Mats
    Competition in services or infrastructure-based competition?2004In: An anthology on the foundations for competition and development in electronic communications markets, Stockholm: Post- och telestyrelsen , 2004, p. 6-55Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 7.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Competition in services or infrastructure-based competition?: a review of the regulatory schemes2008In: Infrastructure versus service-based competition: the case of mobile telecommunications / [ed] Laurent Benzoni; Patrice Geoffron; Martin Cave, Paris: Quantifica publishing , 2008, p. 17-32Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Bergman, Mats
    Uppsala universitet.
    Competition law, competition policy, and deregulation2002In: Swedish Economic Policy Review, ISSN 1400-1829, Vol. 9, no 2, p. 93-128Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A number of Swedish industries were deregulated in the early 1990s, most of which were network industries, where there exists a critical bottleneck (infrastructure) stage. Since a firm controlling the bottleneck has significant market power, it is often necessary to implement a competition policy limiting the exercise of this power. The two traditional methods for controlling market power in this context are price regulation and public control over the entire industry (e.g., through a public utility). Deregulation amounts to abandoning these methods and, in many cases, access regulation is introduced instead. In addition, structural measures, such as vertical and horizontal separation, are often used. This article argues that access regulation (sector-specific regulation), structural measures and competition law are complementary policy tools. Access regulation gives the entrant access to the essential infrastructure, thus making it possible for the entrant to produce. Arguably, the most important effect of the structural measures is to facilitate regulation. In practice, the most important effect of competition law is to prevent customer lock-ins. The latter conclusion is supported by an analysis of Swedish competition law cases in recently deregulated industries. The analysis shows that the most important cases concern attempts by the incumbent to lock in customers, e.g., through fidelity rebates or tying. Furthermore, it shows that in the Competition Authority's cases, recently deregulated industries are overrepresented, relative to the GDP weight of the industries, by approximately a factor of three.

  • 9.
    Bergman, Mats
    ECON.
    Det amerikanska Microsoftfallet2001In: Konkurrensnytt, ISSN 1404-7217, no 11, p. 6-7Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 10.
    Bergman, Mats
    Nationalekonomi, Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sverige.
    Dimensionering av högre utbildning – vem är det egentligen som styr?2023Report (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sverige.
    E-handeln förändrar staden2021In: Att göra stad i Stockholms urbana periferi / [ed] Malin Gawell; Apostolis Papakostas, Stockholm: Stockholmia förlag, 2021, p. 385-394Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 12. Bergman, Mats
    Ekonomisk expertgrupp förordar effektanalys2005In: Konkurrensnytt, ISSN 1404-7217, no 6, p. 4-5Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 13.
    Bergman, Mats
    Konkurrensverket.
    En utmanares uppgång och fall: åtta år med en avreglerad inrikes flygmarknad2001In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 29, no 1, p. 41-54Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Efter avregleringen av inrikesflyget år 1992 har SAS utmanats av främst Transwede och Malmö Aviation, vilka båda köpts av Braathens. Transwede etablerade sig på Arlanda och utövade i mitten av 1990-talet ett påtagligt konkurrenstryck mot SAS. Bolaget lyckades aldrig bli lönsamt, varför hela dess linjenät nu är nedlagt. Artikeln argumenterar för att det är passagerarnas lojalitet med SAS som är främsta skälet till bolagets misslyckande, och att denna lojalitet delvis grundar sig på naturliga nätverksfördelar, men delvis också är resultatet av lojalitetsskapande åtgärder från SAS sida. Malmö Aviation har haft en mer marginell betydelse för konkurrensen, men har varit lönsamt.

  • 14.
    Bergman, Mats
    ECON, Center för ekonomisk analys.
    EUs tuffare regeltolkning riskerar blockera fusioner2001In: Dagens industri, ISSN 0346-640X, no fredag 6 juliArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 15.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sverige.
    Konkurrens- och regleringspolitik i Sverige2011In: Marknad och politik / [ed] Lars Hultkrantz; Hans Tson Söderström, Stockholm: SNS förlag, 2011, 9, p. 256-290Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Bergman, Mats
    Konkurrensverket.
    Kunderna betalar inte kartellböter2005In: Dagens industri, ISSN 0346-640X, no onsdag 2 mars, p. 5-5Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 17.
    Bergman, Mats
    ECON.
    Lärobok för regelnissar: en ESO-rapport om regelhantering vid avregleringar : rapport till Expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi - [ESO]2002Report (Other academic)
  • 18.
    Bergman, Mats
    Uppsala universitet.
    Missbruk av dominerande ställning på avreglerade marknader2003In: Europarättslig tidskrift, ISSN 1403-8722, E-ISSN 2002-3561, Vol. 6, no 1, p. 21-39Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi; Uppsala universitet.
    Offentlig upphandling och offentliga inköp: omfattning och sammansättning2008Report (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Bergman, Mats
    Handelshögskolan, Göteborgs universitet, Göteborg, Sverige.
    Pantsystemens effekter på miljö och konkurrens2003In: Pant och retur: konkurrenseffekter av pant- och retursystem för dryckesförpackningar, Stockholm: Konkurrensverket , 2003Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Bergman, Mats
    Göteborg University; Uppsala University.
    Payment system efficiency and pro-competitive regulation2003In: Economic Review, ISSN 2001-029X, no 4, p. 25-52Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Effective competition guarantees that prices are set at such a level that efficiency is promoted (resulting in so-called allocative efficiency), but in markets characterised by large returns to scale and strong network effects, it may be too costly to have more than one firm operating. In such markets, known as natural monopolies, technical efficiency is best achieved by a single firm. More generally, a given market may be too small to support enough firms to guarantee effective competition. This creates a dilemma: if the market is monopolised, market power and monopoly pricing will result in allocative inefficiencies, while if several firms are active, there will be technical inefficiencies (or positive network effects will not be fully exploited). In many natural monopolies, regulators have sought to resolve this dilemma by introducing pro-competitive regulation. This article discusses the merits of introducing regulations in the payment-system markets.

  • 22.
    Bergman, Mats
    ECON.
    Potential competition: theory, empirical evidence and legal practice2002Report (Other academic)
  • 23.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Quis custodiet Ipsos custodes?: or measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of competition enforcement2008In: De Economist, ISSN 0013-063X, E-ISSN 1572-9982, Vol. 156, no 4, p. 387-409Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article surveys, discusses and classifies methods for ex-post evaluation of the efficiency of competition authorities: court appeals, peer reviews, case studies, event studies, (authorities' own) bottom-up calculations of consumer gains, deadweight-loss estimates, cross-country panel studies etc. Based on empirical estimates from other types of studies and on a simple oligopoly model, one conclusion is that many bottom-up calculations are based on exaggerated estimates of gains from cartel enforcement, relative to those from merger enforcement. Another conclusion is that authorities' ex-post self evaluations are of limited value, relative to external evaluations.

  • 24.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Sverige.
    Svensk marknads- och konkurrenspolitik2014In: Marknad och politik / [ed] Lars Hultkrantz; Hans Tson Söderström, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2014, 11.[omarb.], p. 253-289Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 25.
    Bergman, Mats
    Swedish Competition Authority.
    The Bronner case: a turning point for the essential facilities doctrine?2000In: European Competition Law Review, ISSN 0144-3054, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 59-63Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The effect of applying the essential facilities doctrine is that the competition authorities can require a particularly pro-competitive behaviour of a dominant firm. In situations when a facility is found to be "essential" it is seen as an abuse not to give competitors access to the facility at non-discriminatory terms. As an example, the European Commission has established, in the Sea Containers/Stena Sealink case, that a port owned by a shipping company can be essential for competing shipping companies.

  • 26.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Upphandling och kundval av välfärdstjänster: en teoribakgrund2013Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Upphandling och kundval av välfärdstjänster och hur dessa bör utformas diskuteras utifrån ett teoretiskt och generellt ekonomiskt perspektiv, med fokus på entreprenader. Insikter ger den nationalekonomiska forskningen om hur upphandling och kundval kan förväntas fungera på marknader som dessa sammanfattas. Metoder för val av leverantör och kontraktsmodeller som är mer ändamålsenliga än andra beskrivs. Valet mellan upphandling och kundval diskuteras.

  • 27.
    Bergman, Mats
    Konkurrensverket.
    Återgång till planekonomi ger oss inte lägre elpriser2005In: Dagens industri, ISSN 0346-640X, no lördag 19 november, p. 3-3Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 28.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    Swedish competition authority; The research institute of industrial economics.
    The role of the essential facilities doctrine2001In: Antitrust Bulletin, ISSN 0003-603X, Vol. 46, no 2, p. 403-434Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 29.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
    When should an incumbent be obliged to share its infrastructure with an entrant under the general competition rules?2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the essential facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the "Bronner criterion", proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when an infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in moderately mature markets.

  • 30.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    Swedish Competition Authority; Department of Economics, Södertörn University College, Huddinge, Sweden.
    When should an incumbent be obliged to share its infrastructure with an entrant under the general competition rules?2005In: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, ISSN 1566-1679, E-ISSN 1573-7012, Vol. 5, no 1, p. 5-26Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the essential-facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the "Bronner criterion", proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when a symmetric infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in low-risk mature markets.

  • 31.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University of South Stockholm, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Coate, Malcolm B.
    Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, United States.
    Jakobsson, Maria
    Pfizer AB, Sollentuna, Sweden.
    Ulrick, Shawn W.
    Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, United States.
    Comparing merger policies in the European Union and the United States2010In: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0889-938X, E-ISSN 1573-7160, Vol. 36, no 4, p. 305-331Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We collect a sample of EU and US merger investigations, estimate models of the regulatory decisions, and use the models to compare merger policies. Our approach allows us to decompose observed differences into policy effects and case-mix effects. Focusing on dominance mergers, we find that the EU is tougher than the US on average, in particular for mergers resulting in moderate market shares. However, the US appears to be more aggressive for coordinated interaction and non-dominance unilateral effects cases. Overall, our analysis detects substantial differences in policies, but it does not classify one regime as being more aggressive than the other.

  • 32.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University.
    Coate, Malcolm B.
    Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
    Jakobsson, Maria
    Stockholm University; Pfizer.
    Ulrick, Shawn W.
    Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
    Merger control in the European Union and the United States: just the facts2011In: European Competition Journal, ISSN 1744-1056, E-ISSN 1757-8396, Vol. 7, no 1, p. 89-125Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using a combination of public and internal information, this paper compares and contrasts European Union (EU) and United States (US) merger policies. Common economic analysis leads both authorities to subject remarkably comparable portfolios of mergers to close scrutiny. Vertical mergers account for less than 10%, and potential competition matters for around 5%, of in-depth merger investigations in both jurisdictions, while purely conglomerate mergers are extremely rare or non-existent. The share of collusion investigations falls over time in both jurisdictions. However, the US relies on collusion theory more than three times as often as the EU, where over 80% of the horizontal cases address dominance. Across both regimes, roughly one eighth of all recent horizontal investigations have been analysed as non-dominance unilateral-effects cases. Only minor differences in the average probability of a merger being challenged are observed when controlling for market share. The 2004 EU reforms seem to be leading towards at least some convergence of enforcement policy.

  • 33.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Coate, Malcom B.
    Södertörn University, Stockholm; Coate and Ulrick, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
    Mai Thi Van, Anh
    Södertörn University, Stockholm; Coate and Ulrick, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
    Ulrick, Shawn W.
    Södertörn University, Stockholm; Coate and Ulrick, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
    Does merger policy converge after the 2004 European Union reform?2019In: Journal of Competition Law and Economics, ISSN 1744-6414, E-ISSN 1744-6422, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 664-689Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The European Union (EU) formally changed its merger policy in 2004, moving from a dominance standard to one based on a significant impediment of effective competition, which appears more closely aligned with the U.S. substantial lessening of competition standard. We use data from both before and after this reform to explore whether EU policy has converged toward the U.S. standard. We start by identifying changes in the EU regime and detect a softer EU policy for unilateral effects. We model the outcomes of EU and U.S. investigations with logit models and use their predictions in decompositions and other exercises to show policy convergence for unilateral effects cases.

  • 34.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Johansson, Per
    Department of Economics Uppsala University, UCLS, IZA, IFAU, Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Foreign ownership and investment: do firms locate investments close to the headquarter?2011In: Review of World Economics, ISSN 1610-2878, E-ISSN 1610-2886, Vol. 147, no 4, p. 621-642Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using an international panel data set of the European pulp and paper industry, we address the issue of a possible home-bias effect for real investments in plants with foreign and domestic locations. We find that there is no effect after controlling for firm effects and plant and firm size. These findings are rubust to a number of different econometric specifications, including a difference-in-difference approach. Our findings appear to be relevant for the debate on the effect of foreign takeovers. As far as we are aware, home-bias effects in real investments within multinational firms have not been studied previously.

  • 35.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    ECON - Centre for Economic Analysis, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Johansson, Per
    Large investments in the pulp and paper industry: A count-data regression analysis2002In: Journal of Forest Economics, ISSN 1104-6899, E-ISSN 1618-1530, Vol. 8, no 1, p. 29-52Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyses the effects of price and market size variables on the investment propensities in the pulp and paper industry. A panel of 15 European countries in the time period 1988-1997 is used in the regression analysis. We find the wages, the USD/ECU exchange rate, the price of paper and the installed production capacity to be the main determinants of large investments in this industry. Our measure of market size has no - or only very small - effects.

  • 36.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Jordahl, Henrik
    Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Choice and competition in the welfare state: home care as the ideal quasi-market2018Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We study a reform by which a standardized model of choice and competition was introduced in tax-financed home care in a majority of Swedish municipalities. The market for home care is of particular interest since it is close to the ideal quasi-market. For identification, we exploit the different timing of reform implementation across municipalities. We find that the introduction of free choice and free entry in home care increased perceived quality by about one quarter of a standard deviation without affecting costs. Since satisfaction is unrelated to the private market share, the underlying mechanism seems to be new choice opportunities rather than competition or an advantage of private providers.

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  • 37.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Mai, Anh
    Örebro universitet, Handelshögskolan vid Örebro Universitet.
    Accountable regulators - to whom?: a survey-based analysis of national regulatory authorities' governanceManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 38.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Mai, Anh
    Södertörn University, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Regulatory accountability, power sharing and corruptionManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm, Sweden, Luleå University of Technology, Div. of Economics, Luleå, Sweden.
    Nilsson, Mats
    Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Imports of pulpwood and price discrimination: a test of buying power in the Swedish pulpwood market1999In: Journal of Forest Economics, ISSN 1104-6899, E-ISSN 1618-1530, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 365-385Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Swedish pulp and paper industry's ability to exert monopsony power is tested both with a conjectural variation model, which parameterizes the firms' expectations about other firms' behavior, and with a model that estimates country-specific effects and effects of currency fluctuations on import prices. We use industry data for the 1970-1993 period and find only weak evidence of market power, in spite of the apparent lack of competition.

  • 40.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Stake, Johan Y.
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Bid distribution and transaction costs2015In: Journal of Applied Economics, ISSN 1514-0326, E-ISSN 1667-6726Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 41. Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Bergström, Fredrik
    Josephson, Jens
    Sandström, Mikael
    Prisskillnader - finns de och varför?2002Report (Other academic)
  • 42. Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Carlsson, Kenny
    Holgersson, Jörgen
    EU-kommissionens förslag till "Horizontal Merger Guidelines": en kommentar2003In: Konkurrensnytt, ISSN 1404-7217, no 2, p. 6-7Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 43.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Nationalekonomi, Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sverige.
    Felländer, Anna
    KTH, Stockholm, Sverige.
    Åsbrink, Erik
    Handelns ekonomiska råd, Stockholm, Sverige.
    Handelns betydelse: då, nu och i framtiden2017Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 44.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Fredén, Annika
    Department of Political Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden.
    Collegiality and efficiency in bureaucracy2022In: Public Policy and Administration, ISSN 0952-0767, E-ISSN 1749-4192, Vol. 38, no 4, p. 492-511Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article addresses the relation between the design of regulatory agencies and efficiency, arguing that authority concentrated to a single individual outperforms more collegial decision-making when the regulated firms' interests are aligned. The tentative explanation is that concentrated leadership reduces the risk for capture. This argument is developed from an empirical case on the markets for mobile and fixed broadband. In the mobile market, the regulated firms are similarly positioned, whereas in the fixed broadband market, the firms typically have adversarial positions, with an incumbent being challenged by entrants. A statistical analysis of regulatory agencies in 33 European countries lends support to the argument that regulation of mobile broadband benefits from having a single decision-maker whereas a bureaucratic regulation with more collegiality functions as well for the fixed broadband.

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  • 45.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sverige.
    Frisén, Håkan
    Hermansson, Cecilia
    Kungliga Tekniska högskolan, Stockholm, Sverige.
    Nilsson, Elin
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Business Administration.
    Handeln i svåra tider2023Report (Other academic)
  • 46.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Sverige.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Fler konkurrenter är nyckeln för att sänka läkemedelspriserna2017In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 45, no 7, p. 18-29Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Vi finner att fler konkurrenter på marknader för receptbelagda läkemedel varspatent löpt ut leder till lägre priser. Resultatet är väntat, men att empirisktkvantifiera effekten av ökad konkurrens på priset har visat sig vara förhållandevisbesvärligt. Orsaken till detta är problem såsom omvänd kausalitet ochicke-observerade kvalitetsskillnader, men på de marknader vi studerar är dessaproblem små. Resultaten visar att effekten av ytterligare konkurrenter är storäven när det befintliga antalet är betydande. Exempelvis medför en ökning frånsju till tio företag på lång sikt 21 procent lägre priser på generiska kopior.

  • 47.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    HUI Research och Södertörns högskola, Sverige.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics. HUI Research.
    Rudholm, Niklas
    HUI Research och Högskolan Dalarna, Sverige.
    Apoteksmarknadens omreglering: effekter på följsamhet, priser och kostnader per dygnsdos2012Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna rapport ingår som en del i Tillväxtanalys projekt att utvärdera effekterna av omregleringen av apoteksmarknaden, särskilt vad gäller priserna. Uppdraget är en uppföljning och utvidgning av Tillväxtanalys WP/PM 2011:50 författat av Bergman och Rudholm. Syftet är att empiriskt studera hur omregleringen påverkat apotekens följsamhet, andel av försäljningen som avser billigaste generika, den så kallade månadens vara, priserna på receptbelagda läkemedel på generikamarknaden, samt vilken totalkostnadseffekt mätt som kostnaden per konsumerad dygnsdos reformen haft. Den senare aspekten är ny jämfört med den tidigare rapporten, medan övriga delar innebär en replikering.

    Resultaten visar entydigt att följsamheten ökat på grund av reformerna oavsett vilket följsamhetsmått vi använder. Resultaten vad gäller reformernas påverkan på leverantörernas prissättnings- och budstrategier är mera splittrade. Denna del av rapporten syftar till att förstå prissättningen på generikamarknaden och att analysera generikamarknadens funktionssätt, snarare än att analysera om apoteksmarknadsreformen totalt sett medfört en ökad eller minskad kostnad för generiska läkemedel.

    Resultaten från uppdragets tredje del, att estimera reformernas effekter på kostnaden per konsumerad dygnsdos visar att kostnaden sjunkit som en följd av omregleringen. Kostnadssänkningen uppskattas till ungefär 10 procent mätt i AUP och ungefär 30 procent mätt i AIP. Den större sänkningen mätt i AIP förklaras dels av marginalförstärkningen och av att en viss procentuell prissänkning i AIP ger en lägre procentuell sänkning av AUP på grund av de prisoberoende delarna i apotekens marginaler.

  • 48.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sweden; HUI Research, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Rudholm, Niklas
    Dalarna University, Sweden; HUI Resarch, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Reforming the Swedish pharmaceuticals market: Consequences for costs per defineddaily dose2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In 2009, the Swedish pharmaceuticals market was reformed. One of the stated policygoals was to achieve low costs for pharmaceutical products dispensed in Sweden.

    Prices and sales data for off-patent brand-name and generic pharmaceuticals have beencollected, and a log-linear regression model was used to estimate how the policy changes affected thecost per defined daily dose.

    The estimated effect is a 19 percent cost reduction per defined daily dose at the retail leveland a 35 percent reduction in the prices at the wholesale level (pharmacies' purchase prices). Theempirical results suggest that half of the retail-level price reduction is due to the introduction of a pricecap for products going off patent and half is due to other components of the reform. Measured at thewholesale level the latter effect is larger than the former.

    The reforms reduced the cost per defined daily dose for consumers while beingadvantageous also for the pharmacies, who saw their retail margins increase due to the reform.However, pharmaceutical firms supplying off-patent pharmaceuticals experienced a clear reduction inthe price received for their products.

  • 49.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola, Nationalekonomi.
    Guibourg, Gabriela
    Segendorf, Björn
    Card and cash payments - the social perspective in Sweden2009In: Evolving payment habits: proceedings of the Bank of Finland Payment Habits Seminar 2008 / [ed] Harry Leinonen, Helsinki: Suomen Pankk , 2009, p. 21-42Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The modern market economy depends on the ability to make payments simply and inexpensively. Yet surprisingly little is known about the impact of these payments. In this article, we describe both the fundamental problems and costs in the use of cards and cash in Sweden, from a social perspective. We estimate that the cost to society of the use of cards and cash amounts to 0.4% of GDP. Cash payments tend to be more expensive than card payments, and the results indicate that cash is overused. The choice that the consumer makes between card and cash is largely determined by the size of the payment and the age and education of the consumer. The consumer also appears to be influenced by cost implications. A balanced use of withdrawal fees for cash and transaction fees for cards could therefore result in more efficient use of the payment system in Sweden.

  • 50.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    University of Uppsala.
    Guibourg, Gabriela
    Segendorf, Björn
    Card and cash payments from a social perspective2008In: Economic review, ISSN 2001-029X, no 2, p. 42-59Article in journal (Other academic)
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