Judging two events in combination (A&B) as more probable than one of the events (A) is known as a conjunction fallacy. According to dual-process explanations of human judgment and decision making, the fallacy is due to the application of a heuristic, associative cognitive process. Avoiding the fallacy has been suggested to require the recruitment of a separate process that can apply normative rules. We investigated these assumptions using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during conjunction tasks. Judgments, whether correct or not, engaged a network of brain regions identical to that engaged during similarity judgments. Avoidance of the conjunction fallacy additionally, and uniquely, involved a fronto-parietal network previously linked to supervisory, analytic control processes. The results lend credibility to the idea that incorrect probability judgments are the result of a representativeness heuristic that requires additional neurocognitive resources to avoid.
Management of patients with temporomandibular disorders (TMD) appears to be more challenging than for other dental conditions. This study aimed to explore the decision-making process in TMD management, and thereby to conceptualize the decision-making process in dentistry. Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted during 2018 and 2019 with a purposive sample of 22 general dental practitioners from the Public Dental Healthcare Services and private practices in the Region of Västerbotten, Northern Sweden. The interviews were analysed using the Grounded Theory approach of Charmaz. Data analysis resulted in the core category 'Combining own competence and others' expectations in the desire to do the right thing'. The dentists showed interest in and a desire to apply professional knowledge, but also reflected on challenges and complexity in the decision-making process forTMD. The challenges were primarily related to organisational factors and lack of self-confidence. This identifies a need for re-organisation of daily clinical management in dentistry, and a need for more postgraduate training to improve self-confidence. The complexity of the decision-making process for TMD makes the study findings applicable in other dental situations.
A large portion of mathematics education centers heavily around imitative reasoning and rote learning, raising concerns about students’ lack of deeper and conceptual understanding of mathematics. To address these concerns, there has been a growing focus on students learning and teachers teaching methods that aim to enhance conceptual understanding and problem-solving skills. One suggestion is allowing students to construct their own solution methods using creative mathematical reasoning (CMR), a method that in previous studies has been contrasted against algorithmic reasoning (AR) with positive effects on test tasks. Although previous studies have evaluated the effects of CMR, they have ignored if and to what extent intrinsic cognitive motivation play a role. This study investigated the effects of intrinsic cognitive motivation to engage in cognitive strenuous mathematical tasks, operationalized through Need for Cognition (NFC), and working memory capacity (WMC). Two independent groups, consisting of upper secondary students (N = 137, mean age 17.13, SD = 0.62, 63 boys and 74 girls), practiced non-routine mathematical problem solving with CMR and AR tasks and were tested 1 week later. An initial t-test confirmed that the CMR group outperformed the AR group. Structural equation modeling revealed that NFC was a significant predictor of math performance for the CMR group but not for the AR group. The results also showed that WMC was a strong predictor of math performance independent of group. These results are discussed in terms of allowing for time and opportunities for struggle with constructing own solution methods using CMR, thereby enhancing students conceptual understanding.
This thesis investigates adaptive shifts between different cognitive processes in multiple-cue judgment tasks. At least two qualitatively and quantitatively different cognitive strategies can be identified: one process in which abstraction and integration of cue-criterion relations form the basis for the judgment (Einhorn, Kleinmutz & Kleinmutz, 1979) and one which is based onsimilarity comparisons between a probe and similar exemplars stored in memory (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky & Johanssen, 2000). Within the framework of a proposed model of judgment, Σ, these processes are regarded as complementary means to deal with a proposed capacity limitation of our cognitive architecture; in situations of unaidedabstraction and integration of information we are forced to handle pieces of information in an additive and linear manner. Predictions by Σ concern which of the two processes that will dominate judgments in different judgment tasks. In a judgment task where the underlying combination rule is additive and linear we are able to abstract and integrate information on how cues relate to a criterion and produce judgments that are consistent with the combination rule. In a judgment task where the underlying combination rule is multiplicative we are not able to abstract and integrate this information, and we are therefore induced to use a strategy of exemplar memory. Two studies test these predictions. In Study 1 the results confirm that in an additive judgment task cue abstraction was induced, while exemplar memory was induced in amultiplicative task. These results were replicated in Study 2, where a more complex judgment task was used. The results reported in this thesis provide tentative support for the idea of an adaptive division of labor between cue abstraction and exemplar memory as a function of the task, an ability we are equipped with to cope with a cognitive architecture only allowingelaboration of information in an additive and linear manner.
Several studies propose that exemplar retrieval contributes to multi-attribute decisions. The authors have proposed a process theory enabling a priori predictions of what cognitive representations people use as input to their judgment process (Sigma, for “summation”; P. Juslin, L. Karlsson, & H. Olsson, 2008). According to Sigma, exemplar retrieval is a back-up system when the task does not allow for additive and linear abstraction and integration of cue-criterion knowledge (e.g., when the task is non-additive). An important question is to what extent such shifts occur spontaneously as part of automatic procedures, such as error-minimization with the Delta rule, or if they are controlled strategy shifts contingent on the ability to identify a sufficiently successful judgment strategy. In this article data are reviewed thatdemonstrate a shift between exemplar memory and cue abstraction, as well as data where the expected shift does not occur. In contrast to a common assumption of previous models, these results suggest a controlled and contingent strategy shift.
Research on multiple cue judgment with continuous cues and a continuous criterion has been dominated by statistical modeling of the cue utilization with linear muliple regression. In this study we apply two cognitive process models to investigate the relative contributions of explicit abstraction of the cue-criterion relations and memory for concrete exemplars in a multiple-cue judgment task. The task was an extension of a previous tas with binary cues (P. Juslin, H. Olsson., A-C Olsson, 2003) and involved multiple continuous cues that either combined by addition or multiplication. As predicted by the process model (P.Juslin, L. Karlsson, & H. Olsson, manuscript) explicit abstraction of cue-criterion relations were induced in the additive task, while exemplar memory was induced in the multiplicative task.
An experiment with a mulitple-cue judgment task tested the hypothesis that humans can only abstract explicit representations of cue-criterion relations when the cues are related to the criterion by an additive function. It is proposed that the sequential and capacity-constrained nature of controlled, explicit thought can only induce and execute linear additive cue integration; non-addititve environments require exemplar memory. The results showed that an additive task induced processes of cue abstraction and cue integration, while a multiplicative task induced exemplar processes. The results suggest flexible interplay between distinct representation-levels, a preference to abstract explicit "rules" whenever possible although this capacity is constrained to additive cue-criterion relations.
A dominant mathematics teaching method is to present a solution method and let pupils repeatedly practice it. An alternative method is to let pupils create a solution method themselves. The current study compared these two approaches in terms of lasting effects on performance and brain activity. Seventythree participants practiced mathematics according to one of the two approaches. One week later, participants underwent fMRI while being tested on the practice tasks. Participants who had created the solution method themselves performed better at the test questions. In both conditions, participants engaged a fronto-parietal network more when solving test questions compared to a baseline task. Importantly, participants who had created the solution method themselves showed relatively lower brain activity in angular gyrus, possibly reflecting reduced demands on verbal memory. These results indicate that there might be advantages to creating the solution method oneself, and thus have implications for the design of teaching methods.
One important distinction in psychology is between inferences based on associative memory and inferences based on analysis and rules. Much previous empirical work conceive of associative and analytical processes as two exclusive ways of addressing a judgment task, where only one process is selected and engaged at a time, in an either-or fashion. However, related work indicate that the processes are better understood as being in interplay and simultaneously engaged. Based on computational modeling and brain imaging of spontaneously adopted judgment strategies together with analyses of brain activity elicited in tasks where participants were explicitly instructed to perform similarity-based associative judgments or rule-based judgments (n = 74), we identified brain regions related to the two types of processes. We observed considerable overlap in activity patterns. The precuneus was activated for both types of judgments, and its activity predicted how well a similarity-based model fit the judgments. Activity in the superior frontal gyrus predicted the fit of a rule-based judgment model. The results suggest the precuneus as a key node for similarity-based judgments, engaged both when overt responses are guided by similarity-based and rule-based processes. These results are interpreted such that similarity-based processes are engaged in parallel to rule-based-processes, a finding with direct implications for cognitive theories of judgment.
Encoding and retrieval processes enhance long-term memory performance. The efficiency of encoding processes has recently been linked to representational consistency: the reactivation of a representation that gets more specific each time an item is further studied. Here we examined the complementary hypothesis of whether the efficiency of retrieval processes also is linked to representational consistency. Alternatively, recurrent retrieval might foster representational variability—the altering or adding of underlying memory representa- tions. Human participants studied 60 Swahili–Swedish word pairs before being scanned with fMRI the same day and 1 week later. On Day 1, participants were tested three times on each word pair, and on Day 7 each pair was tested once. A BOLD signal change in right superior parietal cortex was associated with subsequent memory on Day 1 and with successful long-term retention on Day 7. A representational similarity analysis in this parietal region revealed that beneficial recurrent retrieval was associated with representational variability, such that the pattern similarity on Day 1 was lower for retrieved words subsequently remembered compared with those subsequently forgot- ten. This was mirrored by a monotonically decreased BOLD signal change in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex on Day 1 as a function of repeated successful retrieval for words subsequently remembered, but not for words subsequently forgotten. This reduction in prefrontal response could reflect reduced demands on cognitive control. Collectively, the results offer novel insights into why memory retention benefits from repeated retrieval, and they suggest fundamental differences between repeated study and repeated testing.
Background: Many learning methods of mathematical reasoning encourage imitative procedures (algorithmic reasoning, AR) instead of more constructive reasoning processes (creative mathematical reasoning, CMR). Recent research suggest that learning with CMR compared to AR leads to better performance and differential brain activity during a subsequent test. Here, we considered the role of individual differences in cognitive ability in relation to effects of CMR.
Methods: We employed a within-subject intervention (N=72, MAge=18.0) followed by a brain-imaging session (fMRI) one week later. A battery of cognitive tests preceded the intervention. Participants were divided into three cognitive ability groups based on their cognitive score (low, intermediate and high).
Results: On mathematical tasks previously practiced with CMR compared to AR we observed better performance, and higher brain activity in key regions for mathematical cognition such as left angular gyrus and left inferior/middle frontal gyrus. The CMR-effects did not interact with cognitive ability, albeit the effects on performance were driven by the intermediate and high cognitive ability groups.
Conclusions: Encouraging pupils to engage in constructive processes when learning mathematical reasoning confers lasting learning effects on brain activation, independent of cognitive ability. However, the lack of a CMR-effect on performance for the low cognitive ability group suggest future studies should focus on individualized learning interventions, allowing more opportunities for effortful struggle with CMR.
Temporomandibular disorders (TMDs) are common, but many patients with such disorders go undetected and under-treated. Our aim was to evaluate the outcome of using a screening tool (5 yr after it was first implemented), on the clinical decision-making for patients with TMDs. Adults who attended for a dental check-up at the Public Dental Health Services in Västerbotten, Sweden, answered three screening questions (3Q/TMD) on frequent jaw pain, pain on jaw function, and catching/locking of the jaw. The dental records of a random sample of 200 individuals with at least one positive response to 3Q/TMD (3Q screen-positive patients) and 200 individuals with all negative responses (3Q screen-negative patients) were reviewed for TMD-related treatment decisions. A clinical decision related to TMD was absent in 45.5% of 3Q screen-positive patients. Treatment of TMDs was associated with a positive response to the screening question on jaw pain (OR = 6.7, 95% CI: 3.2-14.0) and was more frequent among 3Q screen-positive patients (24%) than among 3Q screen-negative patients (2%; OR = 15.5, 95% CI: 5.5-43.9), just as a female examiner was associated with more frequent treatment of TMDs (OR = 3.1, 95% CI: 1.2-8.4). The results indicate under-treatment of TMD within general dental practice and that male clinicians are less likely to initiate TMD treatment.
We often need to infer unknown properties of objects from observable ones, just like detectives must infer guilt from observable clues and behavior. But how do inferential processes change with age? We examined young and older adults' reliance on rule-based and similarity-based processes in an inference task that can be considered either a categorization or a multiple-cue judgment task, depending on the nature of the criterion (binary vs. continuous). Both older and young adults relied on rule-based processes in the multiple-cue judgment task. In the categorization task, however, the majority of older adults relied on rule-based processes while young adults preferred similarity-based processes. Moreover, older adults who relied on rule-based processes performed poorly compared with young adults who relied on the same process, suggesting that aging is associated with deficits in applying rule-based processes.
We examined effects of normal aging on category learning, comparing performance and strategy choice on two learning tasks: one where a noe-dimensional rule governed category membership and one where a multidimensional rule defined category structure. Paradoxically, we demonstrated that older adults can outperform younger adults in some types of complex category learning. In the current task - which required that multiple dimensions be integrated - simpler integration rules enabled more rapid achievement of reasonable levels of performance. As cognitive aging is associated with a reduction in working memory resources, older adults tended to adopt these simpler decision rules more often, faciliating complex category learning. Results provide some unique evidence highlighting potential adaptive benefits of cognitive aging. Implications are discussed.
We are often faced with judgment tasks that require the consideration of several sources of information. For example, a teacher that grades a student ́s exam question often integrates multiple sources of information (cues: details provided in the answer) into a single criterion dimension (the grade). Ample scientific work has focused on analytical processes and associative memory as two qualitatively distinct ways of addressing such a multiple-cue judgment task, and the inferior parietalcortex (IPC) has been suggested as a key brain region. Here, we combined information from individual differences in fluid intelligence, cognitive modeling and functional magnetic brain imaging to further evaluate the cognitive components of analytical and associative judgments. Participants spontaneously adopted cue-abstraction or exemplar-based memory during training with outcome feedback. Cognitive modeling of test-phase data revealed that model fit of both strategies was associated with fluid intelligence. A whole-brain correlation analysis of brain activation data during test-phase judgments revealed that fluid intelligence correlated with brain activity in IPC both during cue-abstraction and exemplar-based judgments. These findings provide novel evidence for a role of the IPC in multiple-cue judgment, and suggest that judgments with cue-abstraction and exemplarbased memory both draw on fluid intelligence and partly overlapping neural correlates.
We here demonstrate common neurocognitive long-term memory effects of active learning that generalize over course subjects (mathematics and vocabulary) by the use of fMRI. One week after active learning, relative to more passive learning, performance and fronto-parietal brain activity was significantly higher during retesting, possibly related to the formation and reactivation of semantic representations. These observations indicate that active learning conditions stimulate common processes that become part of the representations and can be reactivated during retrieval to support performance. Our findings are of broad interest and educational significance related to the emerging consensus of active learning as critical in promoting good long-term retention.
The field of multiple-cue judgment focuses on the cognitive representations and processes involved in tasks where people need to integrate information across several cues into a judgment on a single criterion dimension. We present here an experimental approach to examine the influence of exemplar-based processes in human judgment, hypothesizing that a default exemplar-based process underlie judgment with emphasis on when cue-abstraction is discontinued. Using predictions from detailed cognitive models, we evaluate participants judgments on two tests with and without time pressure, after extensive learning with cue-abstraction. Results confirmed that participants were unable to use cue-abstraction under time pressure, but failed to confirm the expected shift to exemplar-based memory based on model fit on group level. Participants did however show typical behavioral markers for exemplar-based processes under time pressure, which emphasizes its likely contribution in the judgment process. Moreover, a large subsample of participants did show the expected shift to exemplar-based memory under time pressure. Nevertheless, the results provide novel insights to how exemplar-based processes influence cue-abstraction under time pressure, and open up for the idea of a default exemplar-based process in human judgment.
The brain networks underlying human multiple-cue judgment, the judgment of a continuous criterion based on multiple cues, have been examined in a few recent studies, and the ventral precuneus has been found to be a key region. Specifically, activation differences in ventral precuneus (as measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) has been linked to an exemplar-based judgment process, where judgments are based on memory for previous similar cases. Ventral precuneus is implicated in various episodic memory processes, notably such that increased activity during learning in this region as well as in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the medial temporal lobes (MTL) have been linked to retrieval success. The present study used fMRI during a multiple-cue judgment task to gain novel neurocognitive evidence informative for the link between learning-related activity changes in ventral precuneus and exemplar-based judgment. Participants (N = 27) spontaneously learned to make judgments during fMRI, in a multiple-cue judgment task specifically designed to induce exemplar-based processing. Contrasting brain activity during late learning to early learning revealed higher activity in ventral precuneus, the bilateral MTL, and the vmPFC. Activity in the ventral precuneus and the vmPFC was found to parametrically increase between each judgment event, and activity levels in the ventral precuneus predicted performance after learning. These results are interpreted such that the ventral precuneus supports the aspects of exemplar-based processes that are related to episodic memory, tentatively by building, storing, and being implicated in retrieving memory representations for judgment.
Memory retrieval is an active process that can alter the content and accessibility of stored memories. Of potential relevance for educational practice are findings that memory retrieval fosters better retention than mere studying. This so-called testing effect has been demonstrated for different materials and populations, but there is limited consensus on the neurocognitive mechanisms involved. In this review, we relate cognitive accounts of the testing effect to findings from recent brain-imaging studies to identify neurocognitive factors that could explain the testing effect. Results indicate that testing facilitates later performance through several processes, including effects on semantic memory representations, the selective strengthening of relevant associations and inhibition of irrelevant associations, as well as potentiation of subsequent learning.
Knowledge about cue polarity (i.e., the sign of a cue–criterion relation) seems to boost performance in a wide range of inference tasks. Knowledge about cue polarity information may enhance performance by increasing (1) the reliance on rule- relative to similarity-based strategies, and (2) explicit knowledge about the relative importance of cues. We investigated the relative contribution of these two mechanisms in a multiple-cue judgment task and a categorization task, which typically differ in the inference strategies they elicit and potentially the explicit task knowledge available to participants. In both tasks participants preferred rule-based relative to similarity-based strategies and had more knowledge about cue importance when cue polarity information was provided. Strategy selection was not related to increases in performance in the categorization task and could only partly explain increases in performance in the judgment task. In contrast, explicit knowledge about the importance of cues was related to better performance in both categorization and judgment independently of the strategy used. In sum, our results suggest that the benefits of receiving cue polarity information may span across tasks, such multiple-cue judgment and categorization, primarily by enhancing knowledge of relative cue importance.
Making accurate judgments is a core human competence and a prerequisite for success in many areas of life. Plenty of evidence exists that people can employ different judgment strategies to solve identical judgment problems. In categorization, it has been demonstrated that similarity-based and rule-based strategies are associated with activity in different brain regions. Building on this research, the present work tests whether solving two identical judgment problems recruits different neural substrates depending on people's judgment strategies. Combining cognitive modeling of judgment strategies at the behavioral level with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we compare brain activity when using two archetypal judgment strategies: a similarity-based exemplar strategy and a rule-based heuristic strategy. Using an exemplar-based strategy should recruit areas involved in long-term memory processes to a larger extent than a heuristic strategy. In contrast, using a heuristic strategy should recruit areas involved in the application of rules to a larger extent than an exemplar-based strategy. Largely consistent with our hypotheses, we found that using an exemplar-based strategy led to relatively higher BOLD activity in the anterior prefrontal and inferior parietal cortex, presumably related to retrieval and selective attention processes. In contrast, using a heuristic strategy led to relatively higher activity in areas in the dorsolateral prefrontal and the temporal-parietal cortex associated with cognitive control and information integration. Thus, even when people solve identical judgment problems, different neural substrates can be recruited depending on the judgment strategy involved.
Considerable research in cognitive psychology has demonstrated that testing improves the performance on later retention tests, a phenomenon called the testing-effect. However, the neural mechanisms of test-enhanced learning are not well understood. The current study examined changes in functional brain networks in relation to repeated retrieval (i.e. test-enhanced learning).
Participants (n=20) first studied 60 Swahili-Swedish word-pairs. Subsequently, they underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging while being tested on each study item three times.
Successful repeated retrieval was characterized by decreased activity in prefrontal and premotor regions and in the right caudate, compared to items not successfully retrieved at consecutive tests. Successful repeated retrieval was also characterized by increased activity in right middle temporal cortex (BA 37 & 21).
Tentatively, these results imply that the benefits of test-enhanced learning in part is due to decreased need for executive processing along with strengthening of semantic representations.
The current results generate novel information on the effectiveness of testing as a learning method and thus contribute to bridge the current gap between cognitive neuroscience and educational research.