This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.
This paper examines nuclear energy output in a differential game framework involving two countries. The countries differ regarding nuclear technology with one being relatively safe and the other less safe. Simulation of a numerical model gives the following results, (i) A cooperative agreement will imply less use of nuclear energy compared with both a noncooperative Nash equilibrium and an uncontrolled market solution, (ii) The country with relatively safe nuclear energy technology benefits most from a cooperative solution, (iii) Starting from an uncontrolled market economy, an agreement between the countries to introduce taxation of nuclear energy will be beneficial for both countries. However, by starting from the noncooperative Nash equilibrium, an agreement to slightly increase the nuclear energy taxes will be most beneficial for the country with less safe nuclear energy technology.
This paper addresses social accounting numerically in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The main purposes are to study: (i) whether emission taxes based on static willingness to pay information can be used to improve the welfare level, and; (ii) whether these taxes provide close enough approximations of the correct Pigou-vian emission tax to be useful in the context of social accounting. The results indicate that, if environmental quality is relatively linear with respect to pollution, the approximation of the Pigouvian emission tax will bring the economy close to the socially optimal solution and, at the same time, provide a close approximation of the value of net investments in environmental capital.
This thesis consists of five papers.
Paper [1] analyzes one possible way of replacing dynamic Pigouvian taxes by a static approximation of such taxes from the point of view of social accounting. The idea is to approximate a Pigouvian emission tax by using the instantaneous marginal willingness to pay to reduce the stock of pollution. If this approximation is close enough to the correct Pigouvian tax it will be useful for at least two reasons: (i) it brings the economy close to the socially optimal solution; and (ii) it provides information relevant for social accounting by closely approximating the value of additions to the stock of pollution.
Paper [2] analyzes the welfare effects of an agreement between countries to slightly increase their emission taxes. The results indicate that such an agreement need not necessarily increase the global welfare level, even if each individual country has set its prereform emission tax to be lower than the marginal social cost of pollution.
Paper [3] provides an economic framework for analyzing the global warming problem, emphasizing the use of forests as a means of carbon sequestration. We explore the difference between the decentralized economy and the socially optimal resource allocation, and discuss the appropriate tax system required to implement the first best optimum.
Paper [4] incorporates the uncertainty involved in the production of nuclear energy into a dynamic general equilibrium growth model. We compare the resource allocation in the decentralized economy with the socially optimal resource allocation and design the dynamic Pigouvian taxes that make the decentralized economy reproduce the socially optimal resource allocation.
Paper [5] treats externalities from nuclear power in a dynamic differential game framework involving two countries, which differ with regard to their nuclear technology. The model is solved numerically, where one country is considered relatively safe and the other relatively less safe.
In this paper, we study whether migration affects taxes on labor and capital income. The analysis is based on panel data for 14 European countries. The results indicate that migration does affect subsequent tax rates, and taxes on labor income increase with increased migration, especially in countries with large public sectors. However, this effect is reduced for countries with large foreign trade and/or large shares of elderly in the population.
Purpose - Empirical studies have found an 'inverted U-curve' relationship between emigration and per capita income. In this paper, a theoretical underpinning for this phenomenon is presented based on credit restrictions. The implications for tax policy are also analyzed.Design/methodology/approach - Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model, the authors characterize how the presence of an 'inverted U-curve' relationship between emigration and per capita income will influence the optimal tax and expenditure policy in a country where agents have the option to move abroad.Findings - Among the results it is shown that if age dependent taxes are available, the presence of an 'inverted U-curve' provides an incentive to tax young labor harder, but old labor less hard, than otherwise.